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RECENT DECISIONS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- FREEDOM OF RELIGION -TumoN PAYMENTS TO 
PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS VIOLATE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - Because defendant 
school district did not maintain a high school within the school district, 
tuition payments were made, as provided by statute,1 to the high schools 
attended by pupils residing within the district. The parents of each stu-
dent selected the high school to be attended. As a result of this program, 
some tuition payments were made to high schools operated by the Roman 
Catholic Church. Plaintiff taxpayer sought in a declaratory judgment a 
determination of the validity of tuition payments made to Catholic high 
schools under the United States Constitution2 and the Constitution of Ver-
mont.3 The court of chancery held the payments unconstitutional. On 
appeal, held, affirmed. The payment of tuition to a religious denomina-
tional school by a public entity constitutes an "establishment of religion" 
in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.4 Swart v. South Burlingon Town School Dist., 167 A.2d 514 (Vt. 1961). 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the fundamental rights 
embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment embrace 
the religious guarantees of the first amendment,5 but the Court has not yet 
fully defined what constitutes an "establishment of religion.''6 While some 
of the language used in the Court's opinions would suggest that an absolute 
separation must exist between church and state,7 this idea has never been 
applied to the facts in any particular case.8 In fact, the Court has permitted 
the state to provide books9 and transportation10 to parochial school chil-
dren on the theory that such payments are not an establishment of religion 
but rather the legitimate promotion of the secular education and well-being 
of the children. However, the financing of religious institutions and re-
ligious teaching does constitute the "establishment of religion."11 
1 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 793 "(1958). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
3 VT. CONST. art. 3, ch. 1. 
4 The lower court held that the prohibitions under the United States and Vermont 
Constitutions were identical. The Vermont Supreme Court reached its decision in the 
principal case solely on the basis of the United States Constitution. Since the tuition 
payments would be void if there was a violation of either constitution, the Court based 
its holding on the United States Constitution which it felt contained more stringent 
constitutional limitations. Principal case at 518. 
5 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
6 See generally KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY (1956); O'NEILL, RE-
UGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CoNSTITUTION (1949); Corwin, The Supreme Court as a 
National School Board, 14 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 3 (1949). 
7Everson v. United States, 330 U.S. l (1947); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 
203 (1948). 
SEven in the McCollum case (p. 211) the Court refused to adopt completely the idea 
of absolute separation, because it cited with approval the decision in the Everson case. 
9 Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). 
10 Everson v. United States, supra note 7. 
11Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
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The court in the principal case found that the religious affairs of the 
Catholic church could not be separated from its educational instruction 
and, as a result, concluded that tuition payments were financing the teach-
ing of the Catholic religion. The payment of tuition directly to parochial 
schools in the principal case is distinguishable from the fonns of aid held 
constitutional by the Supreme Court in two respects. First, tuition pay-
ments may be used by the school for any purpose, while the money ex-
pended by the state for books and transportation was earmarked for par-
ticular purposes which the Court found to be non-religious. Second, the 
tuition payments in the principal case were made directly to the school, 
while the payment for bus transportation was a reimbursement to the 
parent. Thus the payment of tuition by the state differs from forms of state 
assistance found to be constitutional both in the type of aid and in the 
method of payment. 
The President's program of federal grants to parochial colleges and 
universities12 is based on the assumption that the constitutionality of any 
program depends on the type of aid rendered by the state. The President 
has expressed the opinion that grants to sectarian colleges are constitutional 
because these grants are expressly limited in scope, while direct grants to 
parochial elementary and secondary schools would be unconstitutional if 
unlimited in scope.is This argument assumes that grants which are made 
for particular purposes will not support the teaching of religion, while 
those made without limitation may in part finance religious education. 
Regardless of the type of the grant, all state grants to parochial schools or 
colleges will aid the teaching of religion. If the expenses were not paid by 
the state grant, the parochial school or the parent supporting the parochial 
school would pay these expenses out of other funds. This means that any 
specific state or federal grant frees funds for the parochial school to use as 
it would use the funds from a grant without limitation. 
In the principal case the school district implemented the Vermont 
statute by making tuition payments directly to the schools where the 
students were in attendance. The statute would seem to permit school 
districts to exercise a wide discretion in the selection of means to implement 
the statutory objective.14 In fact, the court in the principal case suggests 
that payment of tuition might have been made to the parents as a discharge 
of the state's duty to provide educational facilities.15 If the payment of 
tuition to parents were held constitutional, the assumption behind such a 
12 This program is one of grants to state, private and parochial oolleges and universi-
ties for the construction of dormitories. and academic facilities. 
13 N.Y. Times, March 12, 1961, § 4, p. 2, col. 1. 
14 VA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 793 (b) (1958): "Each town district shall pay tuition per 
pupil per school year as billed, but not in excess of $325 unless authorized by a vote of 
the town school district, but in no case shall the tuition exceed the cost per pupil per year 
for the maintenance of such school for the previous year." 
15 Principal case at 515-16. 
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decision would be that the constitutionality of a state grant would depend 
on the method in which payment was made. The New York program for 
aid to higher education16 is based upon an assumption that payments to 
the pupils or their parents are constitutional. The New York program also 
contains a "need" requirement which, according to the New York Attorney 
General, is necessary for the constitutionality of the plan in order to 
demonstrate that the parents and not the parochial schools are the recipi-
ents of the state funds.1 7 Since the Supreme Court has recognized the 
rights of parents to control the education of their children,18 it might be 
argued that there is a basis for distinguishing between grants to parents 
and grants to parochial schools. But regardless of how grants are paid, the 
ultimate recipient will be the school or college in which the parent enrolls 
his child. The substantive effect of a program such as the New York pro-
gram of the federal scholarship plan is the same as if direct grants were 
paid to parochial schools for the tuition of their students. 
The current proposals to aid parochial schools have not been satisfac-
torily distinguished from direct grants of money given in the principal case. 
Neither the type of aid given by the state or federal grant nor the method 
of its payment create substantive differences in result. Yet aid given for a 
particular purpose to the parents of parochial school children has been held 
constitutiona1.10 It remains for the United States Supreme Court to establish 
more meaningful standards to determine what aid to sectarian schools con-
stitutes an "establishment of religion." 
William S. Bach 
16 The New York program calls for grants of up to $150 per semester to students pay-
ing over $100 in tuition. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 389, § 601-a. 
17 N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1961, § I, p. 31, col. 5. 
18 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925). 
19 Cochran v. Board of Educ., supra note 9; Everson v. United States, supra note 7. 
